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dramatic verities and certainties as the mark of an effective critical form in law. Instead, to think law
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article concludes with an example of the challenge wrought by a simple theatricalization in which a set of
images that could and did mean anything were played, allowing the audience to make their choices because
they were unguided. And then the most exceptional and meaningless of the images were explained, and the
horror imbricated in them revealed. This theatricalization did its job, and the text revealed in ways that law as
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‘Theatricalizing Law’
Marett Leiboff

Abstract
To theatricalize law is to ask lawyers to be aware and responsive to the world that creates them and
to be conscious of worlds beyond words. For the theatrical reminds us that law has to see as well as
to interpret, and that seeing occurs through the body, even more so than the intellect. Reviewing
the work of some of the key scholars whose work engages with the concept of theatricalD2izing law,
this article challenges the presumption of dramatic verities and certainties as the mark of an
effective critical form in law. Instead, to think law theatrically challenges knowledge, expectations,
beliefs, certainties, assumptions, and prejudices, and this article concludes with an example of the
challenge wrought by a simple theatricalization in which a set of images that could and did mean
anything were played, allowing the audience to make their choices because they were unguided.
And then the most exceptional and meaningless of the images were explained, and the horror
imbricated in them revealed. This theatricalization did its job, and the text revealed in ways that law
as drama could not, as this article reveals, as a theatricalization of its own.
To be enraged

“theasthai … is to look with one’s mouth wide open, i.e. ‘to gape’ or ‘stare’”. One becomes nothing
but an eye, raptly gazing more than distinguishing matters clearly … the mode of seeing that underlies
both theoria and the word “theater” amounts, on a certain level, to marveling from a standpoint far
from meaning – ecstatic vision, or gawking without understanding. Olga Taxidou has put it well: “the
difference between philosophy and theoria is the body with all its senses. Possibly the difference
between philosophy and theoria is that theoria needs to be experienced through the body – the
1
senses, that is, the aesthetic”.
Hans-Thies Lehmann Tragedy and Dramatic Theater 2016

There could be nothing more damning for law than the mark of the theatrical,2 as shaped through its
classical Platonic, Christian and Enlightenment inheritance which abnegates theater and the
theatrical,3 as a danger to reason and intellect, and thus a failure of the ideal of law.4 Plato, Hans1

Hans-Thies Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theater, trans. Erik Butler (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016),
27.
2
Jonas Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Martin Puchner,
Stage Fright: Modernism, Anti-Theatricality, and Drama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002);
Cf. David Kornhaber, “Introduction: Drama and Philosophy 2.0,” Modern Drama 56, no. 4, (2013): 419-433; Cf.
David Kornhaber, The Birth of Theater from the Spirit of Philosophy: Nietzsche and the Modern Drama (Illinois:
Northwestern University Press 2016).
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Samuel Weber, Theatricality as Medium (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), ix-xi; Julie Stone Peters
“Legal Performance Good and Bad,” Law, Culture & the Humanities 4, no.2, (2008): 179-200; Cf. Martin
Puchner, The Drama of Ideas: Platonic Provocations in Theater and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010).
4
Martin Puchner, “Afterword: Please Mind the Gap between Theater and Philosophy,” Modern Drama’ 56, no.
4, (2013): 540-553, 542: “Philosophy … is not an object of study, like theater, but an intellectual practice.”

Thies Lehmann suggests, is enraged by theater in the form of tragedy,5 but regardless, the ideal that
Plato expresses results in legal assumptions that treats the theatrical with contempt, as code for
speciousness,6 or as the mark of the histrionic,7 as we see in the two instances, the first from
argument by counsel in a 2015 Australian superior court case, and the second contained in a brief
judgment, again from an Australian superior court, 15 years earlier:
That means that without having to go through the utterly artificial, and we would
submit unconvincing, notion of staging theatricals about who would have done what
with increasing difficulties of assessing the probabilities of who would have done what,
the matter raised by the non-disclosure is at the level of underwriting decision-making,
raised in the forensic contest and it is the insurance decision-making, the underwriting
decision which is at the heart of 28(3), and the disappointed insured puts forward their
best case.
HIS HONOUR: I have listened to lengthy submissions, some of which have a degree of
the theatrical, some at times hysterical, and nearly always irrelevant. The position has
been reached where I must say that Mrs Von Risefer has not listened to what the
Courts have told her on previous occasions and she is plainly abusing the process of
the Courts. This application is an abuse of that process. It is only compassion for
litigants who face eviction from their home that induces me to refuse the respondent's
application for indemnity costs.
In each, submission and judgment, we are left in little doubt - we see the sneer, the smirk, the sigh of
exasperation at play. Barrister and judge speak to the antitheatrical prejudice, the dismissal of
theater as subaltern and dangerous but through the adoption of the language of theater, debased as
it is, engages in the most theatrical gesture, as it were, in order to negative a witness, a submission or
a proposed course of action. That the Platonic ideal of justice through word and reason, through law
contra the theatrical is found in this kind of everyday law, the law of insurance, the allocation of
property rights, might seem surprising, for the image of the theatrical is rarely applied to law of this
kind. The theatrical is seen to play out in the most visible forms of law, the criminal trial, the trial of
high stakes that occurs in so-called ‘theaters of justice’.8 For Hannah Arendt the ‘staging’ of the trial
of Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961 militated against law and justice,9 made worse by the bodily
reaction of witnesses as ‘show’. The trial as show appalled her, ‘not just the figure of Eichmann but
also his Israeli prosecutors and even the dramatic gestures of some of the holocaust survivors who
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Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theater, 24: “‘Plato’s rage against (more than his critique of ) tragedy.”
Bret Walker SC (Senior Counsel) in argument in Atradius Credit Insurance N.V. v Prepaid Services Pty Limited
& Ors; Prepaid Services Pty Ltd v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd & Ors [2015] HCATrans 155 (19 June 2015).
The Australian High Court is the ultimate court of appeal, and not to be confused with the lower level UK
courts.
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Von Risefer & Anor v Permanent Trustee Company [2000] QCA 374 (13 September 2000), Thomas J.
8
See, for the example, the Special Issue “Theaters of Justice and Fictions of Law,” Cardozo Studies in Law and
Literature 11, no.2 (1999); Leslie J. Moran, in Leslie J. Moran, Gary Watt, Linda J. Mulcahy & David J. Isaac, “A
review of Ruth Herz, The Art of Justice: The Judge's Perspective,” Law and Humanities 7, no.1 (2013): 113-128,
116; Yasco Horsman, Theaters of Justice: Judging, Staging, and Working Through in Arendt, Brecht, and Delbo,
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
9
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, intro. Amos Elon (New York, N.Y :
Penguin Books, 2006); Horsman, Theaters of Justice, 135; Cf. e.g. Shoshana Felman, “Theaters of Justice:
Arendt in Jerusalem, the Eichmann Trial, and the Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of the
Holocaust,” Critical Inquiry 27, no. 2 (2001): 201–238; Michael Bachmann, “Theater and the Drama of Law: A
‘Theatrical History’ of the Eichmann Trial,” Law Text Culture 14 (2010): 94-116.
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took the witness stand during the trial’.10 But in spite of herself, Arendt was overcome by her own
bodily responses - Plato might have been enraged, but Arendt laughed, which ‘caught her by surprise
and overcame her’, and permeated her writing about the 1961 trial.11
Arend’ts Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) might bear the mark of this laughter, but it is not a laughter
of joy. Instead, this is a sneering laughter that points to the criticism of the modes of legality that
occurred in the trial, and by extension, to the Israeli government. Despite her own treatment in Nazi
Germany because of her Jewishness, Arendt adhered to forms of justice that accorded with
Weberian perfection, and she could not abide the theatrical disruption that she witnessed, and led
to her sneering account of the trial. She despised what she saw as theater, and so too the Australian
barrister and Australian judge within the forms that law takes – submissions on the law and a
decision on the law.
It is in this register that I will be taking this essay. The theatrical, as it were, has been crowded out by
the prominence of the meta-trial, of the Eichmann-type, which can be all consuming of the field, that
is, that they seem and are seen to represent law, and function as all law insofar as law might in some
way speak to theater and vice versa. Instead, my purpose here is to take us back to the less visible
and more prosaic law that embeds the antitheatrical along with the physicality that resides in its
alterity – the smirk, the laugh, the sigh of exasperation. For when I talk of law, I need to emphasise
that it is not the popularly imagined trial, criminal or otherwise,12 or the execution of judgment to
which I refer, nor plays about law. Or, indeed, spectacle or performance or image, in Peter
Goodrich’s terms:
The trial has been a focus of studies of the theatricality of law, usually framed
within a literary argot and method … law in film has become a significant focus of
interdisciplinary legal study, but again the subject is usually law as acted out in
entertainment dramas … the spectacle of law as relayed through the monumental,
written, embodied, and enacted performances of lawyers themselves, gains little
express recognition or examination. Modern historians and humanists address
certain features and moments of the legal spectacle with a wealth of erudition,
specialism, and insight, but their focus is generally the spectacle and not the law …
the show trial, as historical act and filmic genre, rather than the legal mise en scène,
the juristic import and expression ...13 (references omitted, my emphasis)
This latter sentiment, which I will inevitably make less lyrical and more prosaic, touches on my
concern here, that it is through the work of law in its texts and their reading by lawyers - judgments
that hold the law as case law – and the awareness of the stories of lives contained within and that
are plugged into them. It is these and the need for their reading to achieve justice,14 what Goodrich

10
11

Horsman, Theaters of Justice, 16.

Horsman, Theaters of Justice, 17.
Kirsty Duncanson and Emma Henderson, “Narrative, theater, and the disruptive potential of jury directions
in rape trials,” Feminist Legal Studies 22, no.2 (2014): 155–174, who rely on Goffman’s concept of dramaturgy,
theater and drama; Frans-Willem Korsten, “Öffentlichkeit and the Law’s Behind the Scenes: Theatrical and
Dramatic Appearance in European and U.S. American Criminal Law,” German Law Journal 18, no. 2 (2017):
399-422.
13
Peter Goodrich, “Specters of Law: Why the History of the Legal Spectacle Has Not Been Written,” UC Irvine
Law Review 1, no.3 (2011): 773-812, 779-780.
14
But see Nicole Rogers, “The Play of Law: Comparing Performance in Law and Theater,” QUT Law Review 8,
no. 2 (2008) 429-443.
12

calls the ‘theatrical arrangements that precede appearance and audition’,15 that needs attention, in
a world that seems to be ready-made, a law of Google, and a law of the self.16 For justice requires
lawyers to do more than read and apply law – it requires that they have an awareness that will
enable them to seek justice, to counteract that image of law embedded through the logics that
derive from Plato and Arendt and beyond, that enters the body, through the theatrical.

Theater
I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage. A man walks across this empty space whilst
17
someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theater to be engaged.
Peter Brook The Empty Space 1968
[tragedy and theater is] base poiesis, merely the result of artisanal “doing” and not real activity in the higher,
intellectual sense … If artistic mimesis in general already proves deficient and involves only what is sensory,
then matters stand even worse when it is concretely embodied in acting; inasmuch as it occurs through
18
speaking as another, mimesis endangers the stability of the citizen’s personal identity.

Hans-Thies Lehmann 2016
It is not hard to see why the term “theater” and “the theatrical” as a concept can be conflated with
related terms that are familiar to anyone who has experienced literary drama and plays at school or
elsewhere. What we learn quickly enough is that the literary quality and characteristic of these
forms becomes the prime site of attention, as literature. The idea of spectacle and staging and play
and performance, a word and concept I have been avoiding, not least the sense in which
performance has become overborne by performatives of all varieties (as Alan Read remarks ‘We are
all performers now’),19 and the means through which being is created or resisted.20 The demand of
expectation inbuilt in common parlance relating to accomplishment in a range of instances (‘he
performed well’, ‘she needs to improve her performance’), are all bound up in the notion that there
is a representable text that demands conformity. We find this meaning imbricated in the Oxford
English Dictionary definition: where reference to ‘theater, that can be ‘staged’, ‘performed’, and/or
‘acted’, in which drama became play, and play drama. Owing to its etymology from the Latin for
‘play’ and the Greek for ‘deed, action, play, especially tragedy, and to do, act, perform’,21 the
contemporary definitions of drama are fundamentally antitheatrical, or at best, untheatrical: ‘A
composition in prose or verse, adapted to be acted upon a stage, in which a story is related by
means of dialogue and action, and is represented with accompanying gesture, costume, and
scenery, as in real life; a play, melodrama, the dramatic branch of literature; the dramatic art, and a
series of actions or course of events having a unity like that of a drama’.22 Drama, then, is
storytelling, etymologically now far removed from its origins as doing and playing.23 Drama, thus
15

Goodrich, “Specters of Law,” 808.
Marett Leiboff and Mark Thomas, Legal Theories: Contexts and Practices 2nd ed (Sydney: Thomson Reuters
Law Book Co, 2014): 17-20.
17
Peter Brook, The Empty Space, [orig. McGibbon & Kee, 1968] (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), 11.
18
Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theater, 24.
19
Alan Read, Theater &Law (London: Palgrave, 2016), 40.
20
Read, Theater &Law, 41. I do not intend to consider the overly-worn path of J.L. Austin’s performatives here.
21
"theater, n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2017.
22
"drama, n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2017.
23
Cf. Korsten, “Öffentlichkeit and the Law’s Behind the Scenes,”404.
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defined, is conceived as a work of the mind, rather than the work of the body, the ‘artisanal’ as mere
cipher, who will stage, perform or accomplish, that is, that which is theater and theatrical, as a
central conceit of antitheatricality.
To negate the body is precisely Arendt’s complaint of theatricality - as a debasement that occurs
through unreasoning bodies that might be enraged or laugh. But as Hans-Thies Lehmann makes
clear, the theatrical body is something far more than mere cipher, or unreasoning: ‘Body, rhythm,
breathing, the here and now of the unthinkable presence of the body, its eroticism, these
undermind the Logos. This body is at the same time the place of suffering and pain, the mute body
…’.24 This mute body that thinks before the reasoning mind comes into play, operates at a higher
level of function that operates beyond the limitations of text-based drama,25 but rather functions in
a space ‘on the borderline of logic and reason, on the threshold between what is thinkable and
beyond reasoning’.26 For reasons that are historically misplaced, Lehmann argues, European theater
tradition has been dominated by text and word,27 and ‘assigned the highest place in theater’.28 The
caesura marking a return to a theater beyond the text is traced at least to Artaud in the 1930s,29 or
indeed to earlier experiments at the end of the 19th century and into the early 20th century, through
the work of Meyerhold and others.30 To be brief, as Peter Brook’s famous epithet reminds us, all you
need for theater is an empty space with two people, one to do and the other to watch or participate.
To do this requires presence, attention and awareness, not only in that place, but in the preparation
of the self so that the theasthai is rendered beyond a meaningless gawp.
Plays, drama, spectacle – none of these things are needed for theater. Thea, in all its manifestations,
is the etymological starting point for theory, a way to see, and theater and all its derivations.31 But so
too is theasthai . For as Lehmann reminds us in the opening epigraph with which I started this essay,
and as we’ve seen with Arendt’s accidental laughter, seeing occurs through the body as much as it
does through the intellect, and each shapes the other. This is not spectacle or bare show, or mere
entertainment. To be caught in the body is to be responsive and responsible. I will return to how this
might be made manifest at the end of this essay, but I get ahead of myself.
I have moved into accounting for the difference between the forms of theater and drama, before
considering the meaning of theater, for a very good reason. Korsten, for instance, has begun to use
the term ‘theater proper’ when referring to its meaning,32 that is the etymologically perfect form of
theater used in the OED: the ‘Latin theātrum, the Greek place for viewing, especially a theater, to
behold or sight, view, a spectator)’.33 This is why I intervened with Lehmann’s more expansive
24

Hans-Thies Lehmann, “From logos to landscape: text in contemporary dramaturgy,” Performance Research 2
no.1 (1997): 55-60, 57; See also Hans-Thies Lehmann Postdramatic Theater, trans. and intro. Karen Jürs-Munby
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006).
25
Marett Leiboff, “Law Muteness and the Theatrical,” Law Text Culture 14, (2010): 384-391; Marett Leiboff,
“Towards a jurisprudence of the embodied mind - Sarah Lund, Forbrydelsen and the mindful body,” Navein
Reet: Nordic Journal of Law and Social Research 6, no.2 (2015): 77-92.
26
Lehmann, “From logos to landscape,”56.
27
Lehmann, “From logos to landscape,”56.
28
Lehmann, “From logos to landscape,”56.
29
Lehmann, “From logos to landscape,” 57.
30
For example, Robert Leach, Vsevolod Meyerhold, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
31
Weber, Theatricality as Medium, 2-3
32
Korsten, “Öffentlichkeit and the Law’s Behind the Scenes.”
33
For an instance of the confusion of definitions, see Francis Bacon’s complaint of the Idol of the Theater . The
direction of his complaint was drama: Klein, Jürgen, "Francis Bacon", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/francis-bacon/: 3.1.4; Cf. Ragnhild Tronstad, “Could the

accounting of theasthai, and the difference between the theatrical and dramatic, and for reasons that are
reiterate Goodrich’s concern that: ‘Law is a theater that denies its theatricality, an order of images that
claims invisibility, a series of performances that desire to be taken as the dead letter of prose and so
the dead hand of the law’.34 This is far from surprising, though, for to think in terms of Korsten’ ‘theater
proper’ is to limit the thing that the theatrical can do for law and for lawyers (and judges). Without having a
real sense in theater and theatrical function, it is necessary to move beyond the limits of etymology,
into theater as I have already sketched – a place of the body, a place of responsibility, and a place in
which response is shared.
This means returning the theatrical to its place within theater, with the position of theater scholars
as a term of art within theater,35 that has sought to re-orient Goffman’s idea of a theater (as drama,
it must be said),36 and Richard Schechner’s performance theory have opened theater and its
concepts wide, beyond theater.37 To narrow theater and the shape of theatricality, rather than the
world at large is to think beyond the idea of ‘showing doing’ that is embedded within Schechner,38
and asking that we try not to think about our conduct as dramatic scripts in the world (they are
nothing of the sort). I use theater concepts to reorient in order to think about the productive
capacity of theater to help us think in law about ways to see, and how we might train our bodies to
use theater beyond sneering and sighing and laughing, to become more responsive lawyers and legal
interpreters, to think in terms of a postdramatic law.
This also means I will be asking that we are sceptical of the OEDs ‘theater’ definitions which are still
mired in a late 19th century imaginary. We are told of most of the definitions that ‘This entry has not
yet been fully updated (first published 1912)’. That is not to say that there haven’t been inclusions
since 1912, so much so that it holds onto meanings that were shaped in the 19th century and haven’t
moved on. ‘Theatricality’, contrary to its usage noted above, is confined to: ‘A tendency to
theatricality and effusiveness’ (1880); ‘The absurd theatricalities with which the … campaign is now
mainly carried on.’ (1889). It is not hard to see where a judge or member of the Bar would get their
own image of the theatrical, but these definitions also defer to an idea of theater within a narrow

World become a Stage? Theatricality and Metaphorical Structures,” SubStance #98/99 31, no. 2&3 (2002):
216-224.
34
Goodrich, “Specters of Law,” 808.
35
Erika Fischer Lichte, “From Theater to Theatricality – How to Construct Reality,” Theater Research
International 20, no.2 (1995): 97-105; Josette Féral, “Theatricality: The Specificity of Theatrical Language,”
SubStance #98/99 31, no. 2&3 (2002): 94-108; Janelle Reinelt,“The Politics of Discourse: Performativity meets
Theatricality,” SubStance #98/99 31, no. 2&3 (2002): 201-215 ; Cf. Stone Peters, “Legal Performance Good and
Bad,”182.
36
Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York, Doubleday: 1959), draws on a ‘staging’
image of theater to make claims about the self in society, as sociology: ''Scripts even in the hands of
unpracticed players can come to life because life itself is a dramatically enacted thing. All the world is not, of
course, a stage, but the crucial ways in which it isn't are not easy to specify”, 72. But see Greta Bird and Nicole
Rogers, “Talking to Judges about the Art of Judging: An Annotated Performance Text,” Public Space: The
Journal of Law and Social Justice 3, (2009): Article 4, 1-18, and accompanying multimedia performance.
37
Schechner is the founder of performance studies, which takes the concept of the lived encounter, within and
beyond a theater space, that is, into the myriad forms of lived experience. Among his work in the field, see, for
example: Richard Schechner, Performed Imaginaries (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015); Richard Schechner,
Performance theory: Essays on performance theory, 1970-1976 (London: Routledge, 2003); Richard Schechner,
The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance (London: Routledge, 1993); Richard Schechner,
Between Theater & Anthropology, foreword Victor Turner (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
c1985).
38
‘“Showing doing” is performing: pointing to, underlining, and displaying doing.” Richard Schechner,
Performance Studies: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2002), 22.

dimension, that is, that it is a place, a building, that constitutes a theater, and so too, the audience
that watches.
But the OED also synonyms theater with drama to mean: ‘Dramatic works collectively’, ’theatrical or
dramatic entertainment … an action or work of art that has the quality of (good, etc.) drama or
theatrical technique … dramatic effect or sensation, spectacle, outward show without serious inward
intent.’ And this is telling, because the words theater and drama are constantly misapplied, treated
as being synonymous, but most importantly, result in misconceptions and errors that seek to turn
‘drama into theater’. The most extraordinary of these errors is found in the entry for Artaud’s
theater of cruelty that strips it of theater and reinstantiated as drama: ‘a collective term for plays in
which the dramatist seeks to communicate a sense of pain, suffering, and evil through the portrayal
of extreme physical violence’.39 That is a profound misconception and misdescription of the Theater
of Cruelty – it is theater (not drama) that seeks to penetrate or pierce our complacency, to make us
respond, into the unconscious, through the body. Artaud warned against such a literal reading: ‘as
soon as I said “cruelty” everyone took it to mean “blood”. But a “theater of cruelty” means theater
that is difficult and cruel for myself first of all’.40 Moreover, the theater of cruelty requires no
‘drama’ at all, as the exemplary mode of theater, it is capable of functioning within Brook’s empty
space: ‘Theater can reinstruct those who have forgotten the communicative power or magic mimicry
of gesture, because a gesture contains its own energy, and there are still human beings in theater to
reveal the power of those gestures’.41 The conflation of terms along with the inaccuracies built into
the definition, do precisely what Goodrich notes is wrong about legal interpreters – that in law we
believe words to always be correct (acknowledging the rule of statutory construction, that
dictionary definitions are only opinions of words), but these definition of theater of cruelty in the
OED demands conformity with expectation – drama as literature, and theater as something excess
and unacceptable, as a body that has gone too far.
This definition, as in law, is remade to conform to expectations, in which the bodily cannot be
comprehended. The Theater of Cruelty is the exemplary form through which the theatrical occurs –
not perhaps the ‘theater proper’ of Korsten, but the theatrical as it was remade, from the late 19th
century onwards, through Artaud. As Hans-Thies Lehmann points out, it is the theatrical (not drama)
makes self-awareness manifest through anagnorisis, that is, that moment of awareness or
realisation. Rather than operating as a dramatic self-awareness, in the postdramatic theater, this
point of perception is meant to disrupt expectations:
We stand [now] before a theater that seeks less to “serve up” a work than to provoke
renewed critical engagement and to elicit judgment and discussion of its relation to
performance … anagnorisis often does not occur in a dramaturgical capacity in
contemporary theater; rather, it takes place as a caesura that regularly punctuates our
understanding of the theatrical process42… Theater is not to be defined as a dramatic
process, but as one that is corporeal, scenic, musical, auditory and visual – in space and
time: a material process that implies its own being-- seen or participation, even as it

39

Theater of Cruelty as defined in "theater, n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2017. Antonin
Artaud, Antonin Artaud: Collected Works trans. Victor Corti (London: Calder & Boyars, 1974), reveals Artaud’s
struggle to explain precisely what the term meant in the 1930s against the existing image of theater in France
at the time.
40
Artaud, Antonin Artaud, 60.
41
Artaud, Antonin Artaud, 61.
42
Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theater, 163.

displays a certain opacity that resists full perceptive penetration [wahrnehmende
Durchdringung] just as much as it refuses complete rationalization.43
This, of course, is precisely the thing that law is afraid of, what Arendt feared, and that our imagined
belief in the ability of words to armour and defend against this kind of rupture that this kind of
anagnorisis requires of us. As Christian Biet remarks, in its intervention in politics and the polis,
theater: ‘complexifies the data it introduces in an ephemeral presence, or an ephemeral present,
before and with co-present individuals. In doing that, it brings life to these judgements, gives them a
body and flesh of a different kind than that of images.’44 The belief in a perceptual possibility is
bound up within law, but of course it is something that normally is imagined as a form of the
unconscious or the invisible. Theater, of course, through our bodies, makes this present in ways that
are both dangerous and misunderstood. It is this kind of theater and its practices that has something
to tell us in law, but one which has been largely overlooked in favour of the literary as drama, the
political as theater, the theoretical as drama, though there has been a lively engagement with
theater through Badiou,45 Artaud, via Derrida,46 or the immensely significant work that has derived
through Legendre,47 through Peter Goodrich’s work,48and the spectacle, 49 the unconscious,50 and
the mask.51 Bu there is theater too, theater of the kind that I have been playing out in this essay.
There are limited instances of the theatrical at play. Peter Rush creates the exemplary theater
experience in his essay in the first issue of Law and Critique,52 while my theatricalisations are
sometimes read as stories, as a reframing as drama, in ways that I did not expect.53 That is not to say
that the dramatic and the play as sites of law and as critical interventions as justice, is
inconsequential. On the contrary. From the immense literature spawned by Hegel’s reading of
Antigone and Benjamin’s Trauerspiel,54 from Aristodemou to Extabe, Paul Raffield’s readings of law
43
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within Shakespeare as drama and theater,55 and the critical readings of law through the play as text,
such as Honni van Rijskijk’s readings of Sarah Kane’s Blasted,56 or the transcript of trials and
judgments reinscribed as play - testimonial or tribunal theater – amply reveals the play and place of
play and drama as a critical account of law and concerns of justice. Along with political theater,
Augusto Boal’s spect-actor and his legislative theater, this theater all tells us something about law, as
too its filmic double; the move into theatrocracy important as a political challenge, but it is the
theatrical anagnorisis that largely been overlooked in thinking about law,57 and that to my mind
provides that thing to challenge To think law theatrically, then, is to think it as a means through
which we are challenged in our beliefs, certainties, assumptions and prejudices, to be challenged to
think what we are and who were are.

Reading
During a talk to a group at a university I once tried to illustrate how an audience affects actors by the
quality of its attention. I asked for a volunteer. A man came forward, and I gave him a sheet of paper
on which was typed a speech from Peter Weiss’s play about Auschwitz, The Investigation … The
volunteer was too struck and too appalled by what he was reading [and] … something of his
seriousness and concentration reached the audience and it fell silent. Then at my request he began to
read out loud … Immediately the audience understood.
Peter Brook The Empty Space 1968
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‘The Theater Lab seeks a spectator-witness, but the spectator's testimony is only possible if the actor achieves
59
an authentic act. If there is no authentic act, what is there to testify to?’
Jerzy Grotowski 1969

The Frankfurt Auschwitz trials are barely remembered now, but when Peter Brook got his student to
read the text of Peter Weiss’ play (that would now be called testimonial theater), the events in
Germany were fresh in people’s minds. In the early-mid 1960s, along with the Eichmann trial, the
conduct of life and death in Nazi Germany and beyond was raw and live. Peter Brook had no trouble
getting his volunteer student to read the text, with no acting or hamming, and the audience deeply
responding. In this epigraph, we also notice that something happened in silence, too, that is before
any words were read. The student, whose silent read had already said enough, changed the
atmosphere, that caused an attentiveness and a response – in the sense of forming a responsibility –
in those present. In Jerzy Grotowski’s terms, the young reader’s authenticity created a form of
testimony in those who spectate, whose responsibility is shaped through that encounter. Let me
now break the spell, for Brook did the same thing with another student, giving him the names of the
French and English from Henry V. It was terrible. The second student hammed, putting on posh and
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declaiming, not reading. The audience, needless to say, did not respond. In attempting to unpick the
problem, the answer of the students was simple. Auschwitz was in a near past, Agincourt aeons
before. Brook then got the student actor to read and audience respond with the Shakespearean
text, as names as lived individuals, ‘as if the butchery had occurred in living memory’.60 Brook
describes a situation where the reader now read the names as if they were live, and the audience
concentrated hard. Now the names hung with a heavy silence after each name was read out, the
reader responding to the lives that had been lost, and the audience responded - as spectatorwitnesses. It was now an authentic, and marked a profound anagnorisis, not in any didactic or lyrical
sense, but through the bodies of those who read and responded. But these bodies were not empty
vessels, the theasthai of their silent responses shaped through another body, whose silence (or laughter or
enragement), demands a response. The precise neurobiological basis for this response is now understood, but
in the 1960s was yet to be uncovered. For I stress, this is a response of the body, first and foremost, despite
the involvement of words. In the first instance, there was silence which drew in the audience, just as the words
repelled in a vacuum but were redeemed with a sense of being.
Of course, the 1960s are now 50 years ago, and the events of Nazi Germany that were still so horrifically fresh
at the time now bear a stronger resemblance to Agincourt in terms of time, place and distance, at an
intellectual level. New horrors have taken over. Brook would tell actors to reach into what they know to make
Weiss’ play speak now, or Shakespeare’s. Without that point of connection, which dramaturg Hana Worthen
61
calls a nodal knot, there can be no ability for connections between actors and audience to be made. In other
work, I have shown how easily the texts of law become something different once a generation or two loses
sight of the events of a past that are imbricated within law, reordering texts accordingly. Without that point of
connection, there is a tin ear. But of course, this is serious when texts are altered to suit, when the point of an

anagnorisis is misplaced and reordered to suit politics or purpose. What this suggests is that the
point of the theatrical is that the way we read is a two-way street, one that demands an active and
conscious response or responsiveness.62
But for lawyers, the idea of the theatrical can be so easily misunderstood. In 2006, Sir Alan Moses,
then a judge, presented a lecture called The Mask and the Judge at Trinity College Oxford that was
later reproduced an article in the Southern Cross Law Review in Australia. The purpose of the mask
was to shield the court, the judge, from their own personal response to injustice, for the law to be
applied.63 In 2014, he left the Court of Appeal, moving to a press complaints role. In The Guardian’s
view ‘He is the court of appeal judge who showed too much personality to advance to the very
summit of the judiciary.’64 As Connal Parsley reminds us (along with the critical position of the mask
and persona in law), the mask and persona, in the Ciceronian sense, was to ensure a conformity and
expectation of being,65 and more recent work on the personhood in law turns us away from the
theatrical of the kind that is productive in law – that is for lawyers to move beyond the theatrical as
a negative and the body of the interpreter as a negative, and move towards the body as positive.
We can look to the work that Ann Genovese, Shaun McVeigh and Peter Rush have carried out on
office, responsibility, and the forms of training that a jurisprudent should carry out for a more
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responsive exercise of writing through jurisography. Their recommendation is to undertake training
in responsibility through Pierre Hadot’s training in philosophy through the practice of writing:
Since the nineteen eighties, law and humanities scholarship and its various
institutions have developed a number of distinct modes of investigating forms of law
and the ways in which we might conduct lawful relations or belong to law. One way
centres on the question of how might a life be lived and lived well. This question,
which has links to the Greeks, and since, sits at the centre of particular traditions of
philosophy, history, and jurisprudence. We call this the conduct of life tradition, and
following the historian Pierre Hadot, we are interested in how these disciplines especially philosophy - treat their daily tasks as ‘spiritual exercises’ or forms of
training in how to live and meet the obligations of their disciplinary, or later
institutional, office. At least in part, jurisprudence, we argue, can be treated as a
training in persona and office. For us, jurisography is a way to train ourselves, as a
form of discipline or exercise, to explain how we think and act with the writing of
jurisprudence. It is not so much conceptually programmatic as a studied
acknowledgement of the relational duties of the writer and the jurisprudent, and of
the experiences of a life lived with law. The duties that attach to the persona of
jurisographer, we suggest, are to take care of the many forms and sources of the
material expression and styles of jurisprudence that the jurisographer inherits, and,
to be clear, that they are not only inherited from jurists, judges and jurisprudents. It
is also to understand how the fragmentary sources and forms of jurisprudence that
people live with everyday (the official, and the unofficial) condition and contour the
conduct of their lawful relations in our own time (references omitted).66
But one thing is missing here, in the forms of writing and the conduct of office that they recommend.
And that is that there is an assumption – that responsibility will come through writing. I suggest,
instead, that it has to come through the body and to acknowledge that a trained body will not laugh
when they ought not, will not be outraged when they ought not, and that the body will respond
carefully – so long as the body (of lawyer, judge, reader) is made responsive and responsible beyond
the self. Olivia Barr’s movement,67 and Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos,68 in the places and
spaces of movement, asking us to notice how we walk and what that walk entails, 69 and what
materialities afford, and through that the responsibilities that the jurist holds and enacts. Thus law is
a call to response and responsibility, to a form of training in life and lifeworld to be an active
lawyer.70

Training the body to take responsibility
In Poland there is a small company led by a visionary, Jerzy Grotowski, that also has a sacred aim. The
theater, he believes, cannot be an end in itself ... [it] is a vehicle, a means for self-study, selfexploration, a possibility of salvation. The actor has himself as his field of work … [and] does not
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hesitate to show himself exactly as he is, for he realizes that the secret of the role demands his
71
opening up … so that the act of performance is an act of sacrifice … his gift to the spectator.
Peter Brook The Empty Space 1968

The core of theater is encounter. The man who makes an act of self-revelation is one who
establishes contact with himself.
Grotowski Towards a Poor Theater 196872

I will end now, with a series of epigraphs, and a small story of a presentation. I am in the process of
finalising the writing of a long-overdue book, Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence, and I am indebted
to Grotowski, the title of my book referencing the one theater theorist who I took far too long to
understand, and his seminal book of writings. I leave you with a small sense of the Grotowskian
encounter, and the demands it makes on the spectator.
It is December 2015 and I present a piece at the Law Literature Humanities conference at UTS in
Sydney. My piece has been placed in a Law and Literature panel. Theater is a hard nut to crack. I play
a series of images, prefaced by a few references from Lehmann and one or other of these remarks of
Grotowski. I play images that might be read, or misread, that have no text, and very little to do with
what I am saying. I refer to a brand-new defamation decision, and the way that counsel in the case
was able to remind the court of the Holocaust, in the face of a defamation claim by a self-declared
Holocaust denier. The court had no trouble understanding this argument of counsel for the defence,
which spoke to a time before. The images flowed, some making immediate sense, the Nazi entering
Paris, and others that seemed to make no sense at all. I asked a French colleague to come, as I knew
she would know the images that made no sense. These were of the Vel d’Hiv, an infamous moment
in French history, that were recently denied as a French obligation by Marine Le Pen, in 2017. I write
these final words on these pages just as she was defeated as the candidate for President of the
Republic. The images didn’t lie, and most of France did not forget The Great Stain. Law thinks that it
is fine to know rules, without knowing, or understanding how to know. We can look to theater to be
reminded that, an unknowing self has the potential in law to do harm.

The Present
The cinema flashed on to a screen images from the past. As this is what the mind does to itself all
through life, the cinema seems intimately real. Of course, it is nothing of the sort … The theater, on
the other hand, always asserts itself in the present. This is what can make it more real than the
73
normal stream of consciousness. This is also what can make it so disturbing .

Peter Brook The Empty Space 1968
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These weren’t the only images I showed. There was a moment of confusion, where I placed images
of Mai ’68 as a link between those of Nazi Germany and what was to come, and because1968 was
the year that Peter Brook, Jerzy Grotowski, and Richard Schechner published or contributed to
publications inaugurating profound changes in the understanding of theater in the west. But there
was another reason, because these images could be and were hard to read, seemingly speaking to
World War Two images of Paris that had just ended. These images meant nothing, for a reason.
Some people in the room knew, but I wanted the confusion to be palpable, to obtain that
momentary realisation of being out of one’s depth, where a confusion of images appeared that did
not make sense. I felt fright and anticipation in the room. But then comfort – of the worst kind new and familiar horrors were restored as the images moved again, into the present. They became
familiar. Charlie Hebdo, the Bataclan, raw and alive, then and there. The images started to make
sense, and those earlier unfamiliar images had the potential to mean something, that might have
something to do with the horrors unfolding in Europe during 2015. The other images, of Mai ‘68,
could now be read, to an extent. The audience was silent. It was present. It was alive.

It was disturbing
And then I explained the most disturbing images of all. They weren’t from the present, or Mai ’68,
but of those events that animated those men and women who developed theater in the 1960s. Here
it was. A few images of men in the street and men at a train station. And of the Vel d’Hiv, images
that looked so ordinary and everyday. But they were not silent, for Jewish men were being arrested
in the street and deported, and the buses outside the Vel d’Hiv were waiting to deport those
entrapped there – to be deported out of France. The words I spoke of the Vel d’Hiv mattered. They
probably won’t be recalled by those there, and I won’t repeat it here, on these page, but they made
the anagnorisis I sought manifest, in that experience and encounter that makes us notice injustice,
and how to keep reminding ourselves how law, without experience, creates the conditions of
injustice.

At these rare moments, the theater of joy, of catharsis, of celebration, the theater of exploration, the theater
of shared meaning are one. But once gone, the moment is gone and it cannot be recaptured slavishly by
74
imitation – the deadly creeps back, the search beings again.

Peter Brook The Empty Space 1968

Here then, on the brink of an unwritten history, on the edge of the positive unconscious of law, similar in kind
to the encryption, is a synecdoche, a mark of a hidden history of the juridical. We have literally to look behind
the scenes, into the emptiness that is filled by images and imaginings, to apprehend the staging of law as a
75
theatrical and present drama.

Peter Goodrich
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